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RESEARCH NOTES 
Support for Legislative Term Limitations 
in California: Group Representation, 
Partisanship, and Campaign Information 
Todd Donovan 
Western Washington University 
Joseph R. Snipp 
Creighton University 
This study uses opinion data to assess the basis of public support for California's term limit initia- 
tive (Proposition 140). We test if support was higher among members of demographic groups under- 
represented in the state's legislature, if support displays a partisan bias, and if campaign contacts are 
associated with opinions. Ethnic and racial characteristics display little association with support; how- 
ever women and younger voters were more supportive. Partisanship and campaign effects appear to 
have played an important role in shaping support for the initiative. 
In November 1990, California became the third U.S. state to place limitations on 
the number of terms that members of the state legislature may serve, following 
earlier precedents set in Colorado and Oklahoma. In each of these states, term 
limitations were adopted through the citizen initiative process. In 1991, voters in 
the state of Washington rejected a similar initiative which would have placed lim- 
its on the state's congressional delegation (Olson 1992). In 1992, voters in 14 states 
approved proposals limiting terms for members of the U.S. Congress or state rep- 
resentatives. While attention has been directed at evaluating the constitutionality 
of (Fett and Ponder 1993) and normative rationale for these measures (Will 1992), 
little is known about the social and political bases of support for term limits. In 
this note we examine opinion poll data to identify the constituency supporting 
California's Proposition 140 of 1990. This initiative limits the tenure of members 
of the state legislature. 
Research on term limits is developing as more states adopt these proposals 
(Benjamin and Malbin 1992). Existing empirical work offers a basis from which 
we can construct testable hypotheses about support for term limitations, particu- 
larly with respect to the changes that tenure limits might affect upon the composi- 
tion of legislatures. Moncrief and his colleagues have estimated a model of cohort 
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retention in state legislatures which suggests that limitations will affect a small 
proportion of members who might otherwise retain their seats in professional state 
legislatures (1992). In a related analysis, Moncrief and Thompson (1991) estimate 
how limitations might restructure group representation in legislative bodies, con- 
cluding that if limits were imposed, long-serving male incumbents would be likely 
to lose seats (with female representation increasing) and Democrats (the majority 
party in most state legislatures) would likely lose more seats than Republicans. It 
would be reasonable to expect similar consequences in California, since the legisla- 
ture is highly professionalized (Squire 1992), predominantly Democratic, and pre- 
dominantly male.' 
The representational consequences of legislative term limitations have also been 
assessed with respect to the racial and ethnic compositions of legislative bodies. 
One potential effect of replacing incumbent legislators could be that racial groups 
overrepresented in an unlimited legislature might be replaced with members of 
underrepresented minority groups under conditions of open-seat elections. In 
California, for example, Hispanics and Asians are underrepresented in the legisla- 
ture compared to their respective size in the electorate,2 and they might gain rep- 
resentation as a result of rapid legislative turnover (Guerra 1991). A simulation of 
term limit induced cohort change in state legislatures finds that limits will not re- 
sult in substantially increased representation of blacks since enforcement of the 
Voting Rights Act has resulted in districts producing roughly proportionate repre- 
sentation of blacks (Moncrief and Thompson 1991).3 
PUBLIC OPINION AND TERM LIMITATIONS: HYPOTHESES 
Less is known, however, about the congruence between expected consequences 
of these measures and factors associated with public support. The discussion 
above suggests a framework from which we may draw some testable hypotheses 
about public support for term limitations. If some voters evaluate term limit pro- 
posals with respect to expectations about the compositions of a post term limit 
body, we might expect that members of certain electoral groups would be more 
inclined to support limitations. This is not to say that we assume voters are strate- 
gic actors seeking to maximize representation of their respective group. Rather, we 
simply test if a term limitation proposition has more support among members of 
groups least represented by the status-quo legislature. 
lIn 1990, 16% of the California Assembly (lower house) were female, while 13% of state senators 
were female. Democrats held 58% of seats in the Assembly, and 64% of seats in the Senate while 49% 
of Californians were registered as Democrats. 
2In 1990, 5% of Assembly and Senate members were Hispanic. There were no Asian members in 
either House. The 1990 census reported that 25% of California residents were of "Hispanic origin" 
and 9.6% were Asian. 
'The 1990 census records that 7.5% of the state's residents were black and 7.5% of the Assembly 
were black, including Willie Brown, the speaker of the lower house. In 1990, 5% of Senate members 
were black. 
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The group-representation hypothesis requires that voters possess substantial 
information about the potential consequences of a ballot proposition. Such an as- 
sumption could be untenable. Ballot issue choices often demand that voters choose 
among competing propositions dealing with the same topic (Banducci 1992). The 
complexity of this process and limited information can affect the decision process 
(Magleby 1984; Zisk 1987). This causes many voters to utilize relatively low-cost 
information (Downs 1957) provided by proposition campaigns when making deci- 
sions (Magleby 1989). 
Alternatives to the group-representation hypothesis recognize both the infor- 
mation demands associated with proposition choices and the potential for parti- 
san/ideological attachments to structure opinions. The decision process in the 
California campaign was complicated by rival term limit proposals on the 1990 
ballot. Proposition 140 was considered to be the more restrictive of the two mea- 
sures, allowing half as much time in office as the rival measure. Proposition 140 
was also described as a direct attack on professional legislative careers and the lib- 
eral Democratic leadership; it reduced the legislature's operating budgets and pro- 
posed cutting pension benefits and salaries for members (Fiorina 1992, 57; Price 
and Bacciocco 1990, 498). As such, Proposition 140 might have received greater 
support from self-described conservatives. 
Partisanship also may define the constituency in favor of term limitations in 
California. The upper and lower houses of the California legislature had been 
dominated by Democrats through the 1980s, in spite of growing Republican regis- 
tration and three successive elections (one of these a reelection) of Republican gu- 
bernatorial candidates. 
Democratic strength in the legislature has been attributed, in part, to advan- 
tages derived from the 1980 legislative reapportionment process that left Demo- 
crats overrepresented in the state legislature (Bell and Price 1984, 206-8). Thus, 
tenure limitations might be viewed as advantageous to Republicans since most in- 
cumbents losing seats could be Democrats. 
Since uncertainty is often associated with ballot propositions, campaign infor- 
mation may be more important for determining the outcome of ballot propositions 
than for candidate contests (Magleby 1989). Information can be received from 
multiple sources including targeted mailings from propositions campaigns, con- 
tact by political parties, and exposure to media. Thus, we might expect that opin- 
ions on the proposition were affected by exposure to campaign information. 
Tests of Hypotheses: Group Representation, Partisanship, and Campaign Information 
The discussion suggests three categories of individual-level factors likely to 
condition support for term limitations in California: demographic group member- 
ship, partisan attachments and ideological orientations, and exposure to campaign 
information. None of these categories constitute the basis for mutually exclusive 
hypotheses; we treat these as comparative rather than rival hypotheses. 
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For California, we define underrepresented groups to include women, Asians, 
and Hispanics (see note 2). Since these groups are relatively underrepresented in 
both houses of the state legislature (compared to their share of the state's popula- 
tion) the underrepresentation hypothesis suggests that individuals in these groups 
have weaker attachments to status-quo patterns of representation that term limits 
might disrupt. To these categories we also add age. The group representation per- 
spective of support suggests that a generational effect may be in operation. In bald 
form this logic would imply that voters in the youngest age cohorts are less likely 
to find legislators drawn from their age group, and, as a result, they would have 
less attachment to maintaining the status quo. Any such generational effect may 
also reflect low attachment to political institutions among young voters similar to 
that manifest in low levels of voting and political participation (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). 
Data and Findings 
Data were collected from telephone polls of California voters conducted by the 
Field Institute during the 1990 election. Three polls were conducted, each with 
samples drawn through random digit dialing in mid August, mid October, and 
one week before the election. Table 1 illustrates changes in group support during 
the campaign period and also demonstrates the significance of differences between 
proportions of groups supporting Proposition 140 on October 30. Early in the 
campaign period (August), support for Proposition 140 was broad-based and fairly 
consistent within each category. 
After six weeks, younger voters became more supportive of the measure, while 
older voters, Hispanics, and Democrats appear to have been mobilized toward 
opposition. Z-values in table 1 indicate the probability that differences between 
levels of group support observed in the October 30 sample reflect actual differ- 
ences that existed in the voting population. Values indicate that differences in 
support for Proposition 140 between age cohorts and between partisans are sig- 
nificant (p = .004, p = .01, respectively). Women display consistently higher lev- 
els of support for term limitations than men, and the small number of Asians in 
the samples appear more supportive than Anglos. However, the differences be- 
tween these proportions are not significant in this bivariate analysis. Contrary 
to the underrepresentation hypothesis, Hispanic support show no significant de- 
viation from Anglo support and Hispanic opposition is nearly twice as high as 
Anglo opposition. 
Overall, the descriptive measures lend little support to the underrepresentation 
hypothesis while offering some support for the partisan attachment hypothesis. 
The findings suggest that support was most firm among strong Republican parti- 
sans and young voters. Data in table 1 also illustrate that opinions were unstable 
across time. This is not surprising given the intensity of the campaign and the 
amount of money spent during the contest. The instability in opinions suggests 
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TABLE 1 
VOTING INTENTIONS FOR PROPOSITION 140 
PERCENT IN FAVOR, OPPOSED, AND UNDECIDED 
(N IN PARENTHESES) 
Aug. 17 Oct. 10 Oct. 30 Change Nov. 6* 
All Sample 
Y: 66.8 68.7 61.6 -5.2 52.2 
N: 19.8 19.3 25.2 +5.4 47.8 
U: 13.3 11.9 13.2 -0.1 
(428) (259) (333) 
Party 
Strong Rep. Y: 72.9 69.8 67.6 -5.3 
(r) N: 14.1 18.6 17.6 +3.5 
U: 12.9 11.6 14.9 +2.0 
(85) (43) (74) 
Strong Dem. Y: 62.1 62.5 48.1 -14.0 
(d) N: 18.2 31.2 38.5 +20.3 Z(,d) = 2.21 
U: 19.7 6.2 13.5 -6.2 (p =.01) 
(66) (48) (52) 
Independent Y: 63.6 73.8 58.7 -4.9 
(i) N: 21.8 15.4 28.0 +6.2 Z(,i) = 1.27 
U: 14.5 10.8 13.3 -1.2 (p =.10) 
(110) (65) (75) 
Gender 
Male Y: 64.7 68.5 59.4 -5.3 
(in) N: 23.2 20.8 28.4 +1.2 
U: 12.1 10.8 12.3 +0.2 
(207) (130) (155) 
Female Y: 68.8 69.0 63.5 -5.3 
(f) N: 16.7 17.8 22.5 +5.8 Z(,,-f) = 0.77 
U: 14.5 13.2 14.0 -0.5 (p = .22) 
(221) (129) (178) 
Age 
Under 40 Y: 62.4 68.7 68.7 +6.3 
(u) N: 23.4 20.2 22.9 -0.5 
U: 14.2 11.1 8.4 -5.8 
(141) (99) (131) 
Over 65 Y: 65.9 62.5 49.2 -16.7 
(o) N: 14.8 22.9 30.8 +16.0 Z(-,) = 2.63 
U: 19.3 14.6 20.0 + 0.7 (p = .004) 
(88) (48) (65) 
Race 
Anglo Y: 67.9 68.6 62.1 -5.8 
(a) N: 19.8 19.7 23.4 +3.6 
U: 12.2 11.8 14.5 +2.3 
(393) (229) (269) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Aug. 17 Oct. 10 Oct. 30 Change Nov. 6* 
Hispanic Y: 69.2 76.9 59.3 -9.9 
(h) N: 20.5 15.4 40.0 +19.5 Z(-h)k= .22 
U: 10.3 7.7 .7 -9.6 (p =.41) 
(39) (26) (35) 
Black Y: 43.7 64.7 54.5 
N: 18.7 17.6 45.4 
U: 37.5 17.6 .0 
(16) (17) (I11) 
Asian Y: 71.4 70.0 80.0 
N: 21.4 20.0 10.0 
U: 7.1 10.0 10.0 
(14) (10) (10) 
November 6th General Election Results. Z-values compare differences in support between cate- 
gories within the October 30 sample. 
that many voters may have been affected by the campaign, or that information ob- 
tained through the campaign might structure opinions. 
One alternative to the group underrepresentation hypothesis proposed that ex- 
posure to campaign information might also affect choices. Logistic regression is 
used to assess factors that operate to structure individual opinions aggregated in 
table 1 and to assess the impact of exposure to campaign information. Table 2 re- 
ports the results of estimations of support for Proposition 140 one week before the 
election. The dependent variable is coded: 1 = support, 0 = not support. 
Three models are estimated with a baseline model (model 1) composed of de- 
mographic traits similar to those presented in table 1. A second model adds an in- 
dicator of conservative ideology and an interaction term designed to distinguish 
young Proposition 140 supporters from other young people who may support 140 
because they have weak partisan attachments. The third model adds three indica- 
tors of campaign exposure to the baseline demographic model. Media Information 
is a four-item index that measures if the respondent indicated using mail, newspa- 
per, radio, and/or television campaign advertisements as a source of information 
when deciding on ballot issues. Contact by Demos. is a dummy variable that indi- 
cates the respondent was contacted by the Democratic party during the campaign. 
A similar variable indicates the respondent was contacted by the Republican party. 
Independent variables in the baseline estimation include indicators of age (mea- 
sured in years) and dummy variables representing women, Republican identifiers, 
blacks, and Hispanics. 
Logistic regression results are reported in table 2. The overall fit of each model, 
represented by a model improvement Chi-square, is significant in each estimation. 
Pseudo R2s (Aldrich and Nelson 1984) are provided for illustrative purposes and 
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TABLE 2 
FACTORS INFLUENCING SUPPORT FOR CALIFORNIA'S 
TERM LIMITATION PROPOSITION 140 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept .640* .541 .780* 
(.499) (.508) (.513) 
Age -.018*** -.018*** -.019*** 
(.007) (.007) (.007) 
Female .346* .356* .390* 
(.236) (.237) (.241) 
Black -.123 -.001 -.185 
(.675) (.689) (.681) 
Hispanic -.316 -.306 -.338 
(.377) (.377) (.381) 
Republican .504** .646*** .397* 
(.243) (.272) (.252) 
Conservative -.225 
(.331) 
Age x strength of party attachment .007 
(.007) 
Media information -.149 
(.141) 
Contacted by Democrats -1.154* 
(.760) 
Contacted by Republicans .871** 
(.488) 
N 324 324 324 
Model Chi-square (improvement) 12.7** 14.2** 19.5** 
Pseudo R2 .562 .561 .558 
Note: Estimated by logistic regression with data from the Oct. 30, 1990, Field Poll. Dependent vari- 
able = 1 if respondent intended to vote in favor of Prop. 140, 0 if otherwise. Values in parentheses are 
standard errors of the MLE. Model 1 Chi-square based of 5 d.f., Model 2 on 7 d.f., Model 3 on 9 d.f. 
Pseudo R2 is constructed with the Aldrich and Nelson (1984, 55-57) formula. 
p < .10 (one-tail); **p < .05 (one-tail); ***p < .01 (one-tail). 
should be interpreted with caution. The coefficients demonstrate that gender and 
age structure support for term limits. That is, when we control for partisanship 
young voters and women were more likely to indicate they intended to vote for 
term limitations. However, the underrepresentation hypothesis is not supported 
by the coefficient for Hispanic voters. Results from model 2 also suggest that gen- 
erational differences found in table 1 are not necesgarily a function of younger vot- 
ers having weaker attachments to the party system. Alternative interaction terms 
which utilized indicators of Independent identification were not significant. The 
independent effect of Republican partisanship also displays a significant, positive 
relationship with support in each model. 
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Table 2 suggests that exposure to partisan contacts plays a crucial role in pre- 
dicting support for term limits in California. Those voters who rely upon informa- 
tion from campaign advertisements when making decisions are no more likely to 
support Proposition 140. However, voters who have been contacted by the Demo- 
cratic party are less likely to support 140, while voters contacted by the Repub- 
licans are more likely. 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis indicates that members of some groups who are underrepresented 
in the legislature tend to be more disposed to support term limitations. These data 
cannot establish that voters supported limits because they expected greater repre- 
sentation in a post-term limit legislature. It is plausible that women and young 
voters supported limitations due to some underlying dissatisfaction with legisla- 
tive institutions that cannot be measured directly with these data. 
At this point, it is difficult to assess how these findings from California are rep- 
resentative of term limit conflicts in other states. Some of these California results 
are consistent with data collected in other states. A study using opinion data from 
Washington state's 1991 term limit contest also found that younger voters and 
Republicans were more supportive of limits in that state, but women were not 
more supportive than men (Donovan 1993). Additional attitudinal measures are 
needed to assess if dissatisfaction with status-quo legislative politics might medi- 
ate the opinions of members of different groups. Furthermore, researchers in- 
terested in identifying the constituency supporting limitations will perhaps need 
to consider how opinions are affected by the context of representation in each 
state. Women comprise a much larger proportion of the legislature in Washington 
than in California. We can only speculate that the lack of gender differences in 
Washington opinion polls are attributable to the higher rates of representation of 
women. To fully model support for these measures, future researchers might 
measure directly perceptions of representation and attitudes about the perfor- 
mance of governmental institutions. 
Support for term limitations in California displays a distinctive partisan basis 
that became more manifest as the campaign progressed. Although journalistic dis- 
course suggests that the term limit movement may stem from a broad-based anti- 
party, anti-incumbency mood, these results illustrate a gap between the opinions 
of strong Republican and strong Democratic identifiers. Moreover, self-described 
independents are less supportive than strong Republicans (see table 1) and young 
voters with weak partisan attachments are not strong supporters (see table 2). 
These data also suggest a learning process. The partisan gap in opinions dou- 
bled over the course of the 1990 California campaign. Near the end of the cam- 
paign, those voters contacted by the Republicans were likely to voice a favorable 
opinion of Proposition 140. This is consistent with the advantages the initiative 
could bring in terms of increased Republican strength in the legislature (Moncrief 
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and Thompson 1991). Conversely, those contacted by Democrats were likely to 
voice an opinion consistent with the disadvantages the initiative might bring to 
legislative Democrats. Given the intensity of the campaign, and that California's 
parties have developed sophisticated means of contacting supporters and facilitat- 
ing targeted absentee ballot voting, the finding that party contacts are associated 
with opinions is not entirely surprising. However, this analysis demonstrates a 
process where the partisan consequences of Proposition 140 were perhaps more 
apparent toward the end of the campaign as information about the issue was made 
available. 
There is evidence this process might not be limited to California. Data from 
the 1992 elections provide further support for the idea that differentiation of atti- 
tudes by partisanship is triggered by the context of the state term limit campaign. 
In early 1992, when no term limit campaigns were going on, the Gallup organi- 
zation measured national public opinion regarding limitations on congressional 
terms. Gallup found equal levels of support among Democrats, Independents, and 
Republicans.4 
Surveys produced different results in those states having term limit initiatives 
on the ballot and the associated campaigns. In 13 of 14 such states, Republicans 
were more supportive of limits than Democrats (there was no difference in Wyo- 
ming). The magnitude that state-wide Republican support exceeded Democratic 
support ranged from a low of 7% (Oregon) to a high of 34% (North Dakota), with 
an average difference of 18% (Public Perspective 1993, 97). 
All of this suggests that the context of real election choices (and the correspond- 
ing campaign) has a substantial effect upon opinions about term limits. Where 
campaigns occur and choices are real, support is differentiated by partisanship. 
These findings suggest it is one thing to ask people their opinions about term lim- 
its "in general," prior to any concrete campaign, and quite another to ask them 
about limitations after they might have received information about the potential 
partisan consequences. It also suggests that patterns observed in these data from 
California in 1990 are not necessarily unique to the highly professionalized, parti- 
san environment of California. 
Manuscript submitted 19 November 1992 
Final manuscript received 16 July 1993 
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